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Abstract
This paper examines the magnitude and timing of the effects of changes in
the monetary base on the aggregate and regional changes in bank loans within the
United States. We consider both Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) regions,
and individual states and the District of Columbia for our regional analysis. The
empirical analysis provides some insight on the bank-lending channel of monetary
policy. We find strong evidence of a 4-quarter lag in the effect of changes in the
monetary base on bank loans. That finding proves robust across all regions and
nearly all states.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: E42, E52, E58
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1. Introduction: 
Textbook discussions of monetary policy generally tell the following story. The central bank 
increases the supply of government money (the monetary base), kicking off a multiple expansion 
of deposits and the money supply. The increase in the money supply puts downward pressure on 
the interest rate in the short run (the liquidity effect) and stimulates aggregate demand and 
economic activity. That story provides the theoretical background for the short-run real effect of 
monetary policy and for the potential role of monetary policy in affecting the business cycle.  
The previous paragraph describes what is called the “money view” of monetary policy 
transmission. It is not often noted that while the multiple expansion of bank deposits and the 
money supply occur, a simultaneous multiple expansion of bank credit (securities and loans) also 
occurs.1 That is, the process of expanding the money supply and lowering the interest rate goes 
hand-and-glove with the expansion of bank credit; those adjustments occur simultaneously rather 
than sequentially. Because empirical evidence does not provide strong and robust evidence on 
the importance of the money view, other researchers now explore the “credit view” of monetary 
policy transmission. The credit view proposes additional endogenous channels to supplement the 
money view.  
One strand of the credit-view literature, called the lending channel, argues that injecting 
reserves into the banking system kicks off a multiple expansion of deposits and credit (e.g., 
loans) and that the increase in the supply of loans lowers interest rates. The falling interest rates 
due to the increased supply of loans supplements the money view’s story about interest rates. 
That is, the injection of reserves comes through an open market purchase of government bonds 
that raises the price of and lowers the interest rate on bonds. More explicitly, the open market 
                                                          
1 See Brunner and Meltzer (1964, 1966, 1968) and Burger (1971) for a discussion of the bank credit multiplier. 
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operation typically affects the short end of the term structure of interest rate. The bank loan 
market reflects the whole spectrum of interest rates from short- to long-term. Assuming that the 
term premium does not change, then the whole term structure of interest rates falls. In other 
words, the long and short rates of interest fall by the same amount, more or less. No reason exists 
for the interest rate on loans to fall by an additional amount because of an increase in the supply 
of loans. The lending channel, in our estimation, does not differ from the money view.2 Rather 
the argument of the lending channel examines more carefully how the money view generates the 
interest rate effects. 
A second strand of the credit view, called the balance sheet channel, argues that injecting 
reserves into the banking system also kicks off the same multiple expansion of deposits and 
credit (e.g., loans) and that the increase in the supply of loans lowers interest rates. To this point, 
the story is the same. Now, the balance sheet channel considers the effects of higher interest rates 
on the financial conditions of borrowers. That is, lower interest rates improve firms’ cash flows, 
lower firms’ debt service, and boost firms’ collateral values. As a consequence, the improved 
financial positions of the firms lower their associated risk premiums and further lower the 
interest rate. Continuing the discussion in the prior paragraph, a lower risk premium lowers the 
term premium in the term structure of interest rates, allowing the long rates to fall more than the 
short rates. 
Within a monetary union, such as the U.S., monetary policy cannot and should not 
attempt to control regional economic performance, such as to stimulate one region while at the 
                                                          
2 Since the multiple expansion process requires both the asset and liability sides of the balance sheet to adjust, the 
money view (i.e., increasing deposits) and the lending view (i.e., increasing loans) reflect the same process. That is, 
it makes little sense to argue sequentially that increasing the monetary base leads to multiple expansion of deposits 
and the money supply that then lowers the interest rate and raises the quantity of loans. Rather the increase in the 
quantity of deposits and loans occurs simultaneously. 
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same time cooling off another region. That does not preclude, however, the possibility that the 
effect of aggregate monetary policy implies different regional implications. Different regions 
within a monetary union exhibit different structures and structurally different regional economies 
respond differently to the impulses of aggregate monetary policy. 
Several research papers (Quah 1996; Carlino and Sill 2001; Kouparitsas 2001) consider 
the similarities and differences between regional business cycles within the U.S. Aggregation 
across regional cycles produces the aggregate business cycle. Thus, synchronized movements in 
regional business cycles produce similar movement in the aggregate business cycle, while 
unsynchronized movements in regional business cycles offset each other to a large extent. 
How can one rationalize differences in regional business cycles? Owang and Wall (2003) 
argue “… states and regions differ … in the characteristics that determine growth rates …. (such 
as) physical geography and endowments, industry composition, income levels, fiscal policies, 
regulatory and legal environments, accessibility to foreign markets, etc.” That statement provides 
a “Mulligan stew” of possible explanations, but with little intuition as to how they can lead to 
regional differences in the business cycle. Rather, they represent regional differences, in and of 
themselves. 
We offer an explanation, focusing on those factors that play an important role in the 
current discussions about the geographic propagation of monetary policy – large and small firms 
and large and small banks. Firms need sources of financing; the flow of funds accounts indicate 
that most firm financing comes through banks loans. Large firms can access national and 
international markets to service their financing needs. That is, they can issue new stock, bonds, 
or commercial paper. Large firms can also borrow funds from banks as well. This occurs, 
however, in national and international lending markets serviced by large banks. Such lending 
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from large banks to large firms does not possess any regional character, because large firms 
move nationally and internationally to obtain the best terms that they can. In contrast, small firms 
generally must seek funds from small banks in regional or local markets. Consequently, the 
regional transmission of monetary policy can importantly affect the regional business cycle, 
through small and medium-sized banks and small and medium-sized firms. 
The historical development of the banking sector in the U.S. followed a much different 
path than in most other countries. The founding fathers’ concern about preventing concentrations 
of power generated a diffused banking system with many banks and numerous geographic 
restrictions of banking activities. It was not until the last quarter of the 20th century that those 
geographic restrictions began to fall. Although the U.S. banking system now permits full 
interstate banking, the future of banking in the U.S. probably will continue to exhibit a large 
number of regional and local banks that serve the needs of small- and medium-sized businesses. 
This paper examines the effects of national monetary policy, measured by changes in the 
monetary base, on national, regional, and state credit availability, measured by bank loans. We 
start by considering the linkages between the monetary base and bank loans at the national level 
to provide a benchmark with which to judge our regional and state-level findings. In that sense 
our work falls into the literature associated with the lending channel, which we view as an 
elaboration of the money view (see footnote 2). 
2. Review of the Relevant Literature 
Regional economists have considered the effects of national monetary policy on regional 
economies, going back to the 1950s. Bias (1992) provides a summary of that work, dividing it 
into two categories – those efforts that consider the effect of national monetary policy (e.g., the 
national money supply) on regional financial variables (e.g., the regional money supply) and 
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those that consider the effect of national monetary policy on regional non-financial variables 
(e.g., regional personal income or regional employment). The former analysis is a proper subset 
of the latter analysis. That is, for national monetary policy to affect regional economic (non-
financial) variables such as personal income or employment probably requires that national 
monetary policy first affects regional financial variables such as the regional money supply that 
then, in turn, affect those regional non-financial variables. Most of the empirical analysis that 
Bias (1992) cites falls into the category of national monetary policy affecting regional non-
financial variables, and not into the category of national monetary policy affecting regional 
financial variables. Bias’s research, however, falls in the former category, as does our analysis. A 
final category of research, not categorized by Bias, considers the effects of regional financial 
variables on regional non-financial variables. In sum, national monetary policy affects regional 
non-financial variables by first influencing regional financial variables and then those regional 
financial variables, in turn, alter the regional non-financial variables. 
First, consider the literature on how national monetary policy affects regional non-
financial variables. Most studies adopt a St. Louis reduced-form equation approach where the 
change (rate of growth) in regional income or employment measures are regressed onto the 
changes (rates of growth) in high employment federal government spending and revenue and the 
national money supply (Garrison and Chang 1979, Mathur and Stein 1980, 1983, Garrison and 
Kort 1983).3 Those studies generally find regional differences in the effects of national monetary 
policy on regional non-financial variables. 
More recent analyses (Carlino and DeFina 1998, 1999; Fratantoni and Schuh 2003; 
Owyang and Wall 2003) adopt the vector autoregressive (VAR) methodology to allow for 
                                                          
3 The regions reflect Bureau of Economic Analysis regions, except for Garrison and Kort (1983) that consider the 
region as the state level.  
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spillover effects between regions. Those authors criticize the earlier work as overlooking such 
regional spillover effects. For example, Carlino and DeFina argue “A shortcoming with existing 
studies is their attempt to measure monetary policy impacts region by region without accounting 
for feedback effects among regions (i.e., monetary policy directly affects region i, and through 
trade with region j, monetary policy indirectly affects region j, and vice versa).” That argument 
misses, in our view, the special feature of the St. Louis reduced-form equation studies. To wit, 
such analyses capture the direct and indirect effects of fiscal and monetary policy on the variable 
of interest – personal income or employment. The St. Louis reduced-form equation analysis does 
not overlook such indirect effects. The VAR methodology, on the other hand, by allowing for 
alternative channels of influence automatically reduces the initial effect of national monetary 
policy on regional non-financial variables, since the methodology holds constant the other 
channels of influence.4 The impulse response analysis, since it focuses on the long-run effects, 
should reintroduce both the direct and indirect effects, generating similar results to the St. Louis 
reduced-form analyses. 
Second, consider the literature examining the effect of national monetary policy on 
regional financial variables. Although Bias (1992) reports a longer list of studies that consider 
the effect of national monetary policy on regional financial variables than on regional non-
financial variables, many of the cited studies involve no empirical analysis. Moreover, those that 
do involve empirical analysis generally involve older data that do not incorporate more recent 
                                                          
4 Sims (1972, 1976) presents the classic example. Sims (1972) shows that money causes income in a bivariate model 
of real GDP and the money supply. Sims (1976) introduces the interest rate as a third variable and the significance 
of money in explaining real GDP disappears. In other words, the money supply’s effect on real GDP goes through 
the interest rate. So holding the interest rate constant, isolates the “direct” effect on the money supply on real GDP 
that does not go through the interest rate. 
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events in the financial sector.5 Bias (1992) and those earlier studies find that national monetary 
policy affects regional financial variables in different regions differently. 
Finally, McPherson and Waller (2000) provide one of the few studies of the relationship 
between regional financial variables and regional non-financial variables. Their study, however, 
does not determine whether differences exist in the effects of national monetary policy on 
regional non-financial variables. Rather, they provide evidence that is consistent with a bank 
credit channel. 
Our analysis considers the effect of national monetary policy on regional financial 
variables. We consider the effects of changes in the monetary base on bank loans at the national, 
the regional, and the state levels, separately.  
3. Methodology and Data 
The Federal Reserve (Fed) employs the open-market-operation sword to implement monetary 
policy actions – no matter whether the Fed employs a Taylor rule, adopts inflation targeting, or 
uses some other target of monetary policy. Students in money and banking and monetary theory 
classes struggle through the intricacies of the multiple expansion or contraction of bank reserves 
and credit, once the monetary authorities carry out an open market operation. Most of U.S. 
banking history labored under the geographic restrictions on bank operations, restricting banking 
and branching activities to fall within state-level regulatory silos. That is, once an open market 
operation occurs from the open market desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, that 
impulse must transverse throughout the U.S. economy finding its way across state boundaries. In 
addition, many states further restricted banking and branching activities within a state’s 
                                                          
5 Samolyk (1991) has the most recent publication date followed by Miller (1978). One important event that appears 
in the more recent data is the absolute decline in total bank reserves that begins in January 1994 and continues 
through the present. 
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boundary (i.e., limited and unit branching states). The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 broke the back of such geographic restrictions, although full 
implementation of the contents of the Act did not occur until 1996. Finally, the United States still 
experiences the transition toward a nationwide banking system.6 
We employ data from three different sources. First, we use monthly data reported by the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System on aggregate reserves, the monetary base, 
and total loans and leases of the banking system.7 That data allow the disaggregation of total 
loans and leases into holdings by large and small domestic banks and foreign banks, albeit with 
shorter sample periods. Second, we employ annual data on a state-by-state basis reported at the 
web site of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Those state level data, of course, can 
aggregate into the eight Bureau of Economic Analysis regions. Finally, we collect the quarterly 
Report on Condition and Income (Call Report) data posted on the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago web site on a bank-by-bank basis8. Those data aggregate into either state-level or the 
eight BEA regional-level data. In all cases, we explore the size and timing of national monetary 
policy actions, as measured by the monetary base, on the national, regional, or state financial 
variables, as measured by bank loans.  
Our analysis proceeds as follows. We explore how an injection of the monetary base by 
open market operation wends its way through the nation, the BEA regions, or the states. For 
example, how quickly does an open market purchase that alters the monetary base begin to affect 
                                                          
6 The ultimate structure in U.S. banking is path dependent. That is, having started with a highly disaggregated 
banking structure, the final nationwide banking system will still exhibit many more banks than most other countries 
in the world, where they did not begin with such a disaggregated banking system. 
7 The data come from the historical compilation of releases H3 and H8 from the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System. 
8 The address is http://www.chicagofed.org/economicresearchanddata/data/bhcdatabase/bhcdatabase.cfm. 
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bank loans in New York, California, Texas, or Illinois, given that the impulse originated from the 
Open Market Operations Desk at the New York Federal Reserve Bank? 
Other authors have employed the same data set to examine similar issues. Kashyop and 
Stein (2000) explore the monetary transmission mechanism, searching for evidence to support 
the bank-lending channel of monetary policy implementation. They use the quarterly Call Report 
data, but examine how the effects differ by bank size, rather than geographic location. Ashcraft 
and Campello (2002) consider the balance sheet channel on monetary policy implementation. 
Employing quarterly Call Report data, they determine the differential responses of small banks 
affiliated with the same bank holding company, but located in different geographic regions. 
Summer (2002) investigates how bank equity interacts with bank lending and real activity. He 
also uses the Call Report data and performs his vector autoregressive analysis at the national and 
the eight census regions levels. 
Assuming that monetary policy possesses real effects in the short run, differences in the 
size and timing of monetary policy changes across regions and states can generate unequal 
outcomes at the regional and state levels to national monetary policy actions. We expect that 
some regions and states participate much later and/or less vigorously in response to the Federal 
Reserve’s monetary policy actions. Moreover, since Milton Friedman argued that the lags in the 
effect of monetary policy exhibit long, 3 to 8 quarters, and variable patterns, we anticipate 
differences in timing patterns between regions and states. 
4. Model and Results 
We explore how changes in monetary policy, represented by changes in the monetary base, 
affect the quantity of bank loans across geographic regions and across banks. We assume that the 
monetary base exogenously affects the quantity of bank loans and employ an estimation 
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technique that captures both the direct and indirect effects of changes in the monetary base on the 
quantity of bank loans. The general estimating equation is as follows: 
∑ ++=
= −
n
0i
titit MBLNS ε∆βα∆ ,      (1) 
where LNS∆  equals the change in bank loans, MB∆  equals the change in the monetary base, α 
and βi’s equal the models parameters that are estimated, and ε equals a well-behaved random 
error. The Appendix provides detail on data sources and definitions. 
Equation (1) determines the effects of changes in current and lagged changes in the 
monetary base on the current change in bank loans. Some may question why no other control 
variables appear in equation (1), for example, lagged changes in bank loans. By including such 
control variables, the coefficients of changes in the monetary base exclude any effects those 
changes in the monetary base produce on the change in bank loans that operate through those 
control variables. Such effects exhibit an indirect path. By excluding control variables, the 
coefficients of the change in the monetary base capture both the direct and indirect effects on the 
change in bank loans. 
Others may question why equation (1) uses the monetary base rather than bank reserves. 
That is, the money view argues that increases in bank loans follow increases in bank reserves. If 
bank reserves do not rise, then bank loans cannot increase, according to this argument. But, the 
banking system and the rest of the world (both domestic and foreign residents) both place 
demands on the monetary base – banks demand reserves while the rest of the world demands 
currency. The Federal Reserve System supplies the monetary base to the economy; the banks and 
the rest of the world demand that monetary base. As a consequence, bank reserves reflect 
endogenous decisions of the banks and the rest of the world. That observation suggests that 
changes in the monetary base probably more closely represent exogenous policy adjustments 
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than does the change in bank reserves. Nonetheless, we ran equation (1) where changes in bank 
reserves replace changes in the monetary base. The results prove significant, but much less 
frequently and often with “wrong” and counterintuitive (i.e., negative) signs. Examining the 
time-series plot of total bank reserves reveals a dramatic fact. To wit, total bank reserves decline 
absolutely since January 1994.9 
The econometric analysis of equation (1) employs three different frequencies of data – 
monthly, annual, and quarterly. The first set of regressions use the monthly data reported by the 
Federal Reserve System and considers the linkages between changes in the monetary base and 
changes in bank loans for the entire banking system as well as for domestic and foreign banks, 
separately, and for large and small domestic banks, separately. These regressions provide a 
benchmark against which to evaluate our regional regression results. Next, we employ annual 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) data on a state-by-state and Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) region basis. The Appendix defines which states are in which BEA region. 
Lastly, we use quarterly “Call Report” data posted at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago web 
site aggregated across individual banks to the state and BEA region levels.  
Aggregate Monthly Data: Findings 
Table 1 reports the results from estimating equation (1) with nationwide bank loans for all banks, 
domestic banks, large domestic banks, small domestic banks, and foreign banks. Because of data 
availability, the regressions for all banks run from January 1959 to March 2003. The regressions 
                                                          
9 Although this dramatic change in trend somewhat postdates the well-known problems with using M1 and M2 as 
intermediate targets of monetary policy, the absolute decline in total reserves reflects the structural change in bank 
balance sheets as non-transactions deposits, which do not carry reserve requirements, rise dramatically relative to 
transactions deposits, which do have reserve requirements. In sum, the monetary base (i.e., MB or M0) measure of 
the money stock may now possess the closest link to economic activity. But this issue constitutes a different paper. 
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for domestic and foreign banks run from January 1973 to March 2003. Finally, the regressions 
for large and small domestic banks run from January 1988 to March 2003.10 
The results for the total bank loans show that the coefficients of the contemporaneous and 
first-, second- and fourth-lagged changes in the monetary base exhibit positive and significant 
signs; the third-lagged term is not significant. Thus, a one million dollar increase in the monetary 
base in one month leads to almost a $6 million cumulative increase in bank loans over five 
months. 
Now, consider the regression for small domestic banks. Each of the change in monetary 
base variables exhibits a significantly positive coefficient, increasing the monetary base leads to 
increases in small domestic bank loans. From a quantitative point of view, a million dollar 
increase in the monetary base today leads to a total increase of small domestic bank loans of just 
over six million dollars after five months, where the cumulative increase is spread nearly evenly 
across the five months. 
The results for large domestic banks differ from small domestic banks in that the 
contemporaneous change in the monetary base exhibits a significantly negative coefficient. 
While this result seems counterintuitive, it may only reflect reverse causality. That is, when large 
banks loans decrease in one month, the Federal Reserve increases the monetary base the next 
month. Concerning the lagged changes in the monetary base, the large banks only possess 
significant and positive coefficients on the first and fourth lags. The second and third lags do not 
have significant coefficients. Moreover, the cumulative effect of the significant positive 
coefficients imply that a million increase in the monetary base leads to a three million dollar 
increase in loans after five months, excluding the significant, negative contemporaneous effect. 
                                                          
10 We include the contemporaneous and four lags of the change in the monetary base. Stock and Watson (1999) 
report that including four lags provides a good lag structure for most time-series analysis. 
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Finally, consider the response of foreign bank loans to changes in the monetary base. The 
significantly negative coefficient on the contemporaneous change in the monetary base also 
appears in the regression for foreign banks as it does for large domestic banks. Also, the 
coefficients of the lagged changes in the monetary base prove significantly positive, except for 
the third lag, which is insignificant. Moreover, the cumulative effect of the significant 
coefficients implies that a million dollar increase in the monetary base leads to just over a million 
dollar increase in foreign bank loans, ignoring the significant, negative contemporaneous 
coefficient. These findings suggest that foreign banks more closely match the large domestic 
bank results. 
The size of the effects of changes in the monetary base on changes in loans across the 
various bank classifications hints at another observation. To wit, the responsiveness of loans to 
the monetary base increased in the late 1980s relative to earlier periods. That is, the sum of the 
coefficients across the small and large domestic bank regressions equals the coefficients in the 
domestic bank regressions, using the same sample periods. Since we use different sample 
periods, those coefficients do not conform to this equality. In fact, the sum of the coefficients in 
the small and large domestic bank regressions typically exceed the coefficients in the domestic 
bank regression, implying that loans responded more to changes in the monetary base after 1988. 
The magnitudes of the effects in the domestic and foreign bank regressions do generally match 
the magnitudes of the coefficients in the total bank regression, indicating that no increase in 
responsiveness of loans to the monetary base occurs after 1973. 
In sum, changes in the monetary base produce reasonably quick changes in bank loans. 
Such changes in the monetary base have the largest and most persistent effect on small domestic 
banks and the smallest effect on foreign banks. Some evidence exists that is consistent with the 
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Federal Reserve responding to the loan experience of large domestic, and possibly foreign, 
banks. 
Regional Annual Data: Results 
Table 2 reports the results of estimating equation (1) on a state-by-state basis using the annual 
data from the FDIC. The results for the USA constrain the coefficients across all states to equal 
each other, forming a pooled regression where the states are the individual units. In that 
regression, the coefficients of the contemporaneous and first-lagged change in the monetary base 
show positive signs, although only the coefficient on the first-lagged change in the monetary 
base is significant. Thus, a one million dollar increase in the monetary base in one year leads to a 
$70,000 increase in loans in each state and a total increase in loans across all states of $3.57 
million in the following year.11  
The qualitative results provide a mixed picture. For the coefficients of the 
contemporaneous change in the monetary base, 25 of the individual state coefficients exceed 
zero while 26 fall below zero. Moreover, 12 of these coefficients prove significant with 9 
positive and 3 negative. For the first-lagged change in the monetary base, 38 of the individual 
state coefficients exceed zero while 13 fall below zero. In this case, 21 coefficients prove 
significant with 18 positive and 3 negative. Those findings prove consistent with the pooled 
results, where both the coefficients of the contemporaneous and lagged changes in the monetary 
base exceed zero, but only the coefficient of the lagged change in the monetary base is 
significantly positive.  
                                                          
11 Although the coefficient of the contemporaneous change in the monetary base is not significant, that coefficient 
implies that a one-million dollar increase in the monetary base in a year leads to a $14,000 increase in loans and a 
total increase in loans across all states of $714,000 in the same year. This gives a cumulative effect of $4.284 million 
from the contemporaneous and first-lagged coefficients. 
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Table 3 reports the results of estimating equation (1) using the annual FDIC data on a 
region-by-region basis. We perform these regional regressions in two different ways. The 
regressions, identified as using pooled regional data, pool the state level bank loan data in each 
region and impose the constraint that the coefficients equal each other across the states within the 
region under consideration. Thus, the USA regression matches nearly identically the USA 
regression in Table 2. The regressions identified as the aggregate regional data sum the state 
level bank loan data into regional bank loan aggregates. In that sense, the aggregate regional data 
regressions conform in spirit to the state-by-state regressions in Table 2. Finally, the USA 
regression using the aggregate regional data imposes the constraint that the coefficients equal 
each other across regions in a pooled regression based on the aggregate regional data. 
The new USA regression that pools the data across regions yields findings similar to the 
USA regression that pools the data across states. That is, the coefficients of the contemporaneous 
and first-lagged change in the monetary base are both positive, although only the coefficient of 
the lagged change in the monetary base is significant. Here, a one million dollar increase in the 
monetary base leads to a $443,000 increase in loans in each region and a total increase of loans 
of $3.54 million the next year.12  
The qualitative results show a more consistent pattern. The outcomes for the pooled 
regional and the aggregate regional data match each other. That is, for the coefficients of the 
contemporaneous change in the monetary base, 3 of the individual region coefficients exceed 
zero while 5 fall below zero. Moreover, 3 of these 8 coefficients prove significant with 2 positive 
and 1 negative. For the first-lagged change in the monetary base, 7 of the individual region 
                                                          
12 Once again, although the coefficient of the contemporaneous change in the monetary base is not significant, that 
coefficient implies that a one-million dollar increase in the monetary base in a year leads to a $91,000 increase in 
loans and a total increase in loans across all states of $728,000 in the same year. This gives a cumulative effect of 
$4.268 million from the contemporaneous and first-lagged coefficients. 
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coefficients exceed zero while 1 falls below zero. In this case, 4 coefficients prove significant 
with all positive. Focusing on the coefficient of the first-lagged change in the monetary base, the 
Great Lakes, Mideast, and Southeast regions exhibit larger positive effects than the USA 
findings. Based on the state-by-state findings, Ohio and Illinois probably contribute to the 
magnitude of the coefficient of the first-lagged change in the monetary base of the Great Lakes 
region, while New York plays a similar role in the Mideast region and North Carolina and 
Georgia play that role in the Southeast region. 
What do the findings in Tables 2 and 3 tell us? The regression pooled across all states 
supports the statement that changes in the monetary base affect bank loans with a one-year lag. 
Disaggregating to the regional and then the state levels weaken such a conclusion. That is, the 
observed patterns both qualitatively and quantitatively reveal more deviations from the 
regression findings from pooling across all states.13 
Regional Quarterly Data: Results 
Table 4 reports the results of estimating equation (1) on a state-by-state basis using the quarterly 
call report data. Once again, the results for the USA constrain the coefficients across all states to 
equal each other, forming a pooled regression where the states are the individual units. In that 
regression, the coefficients of the contemporaneous and one-, three-, and four-lagged changes in 
the monetary base show positive signs; the coefficient on the second-lagged change in the 
monetary base is not significant. Thus, a one million dollar increase in the monetary base in one 
quarter leads to a $450,000 increase in loans in each state and a total increase in loans across all 
states of almost $23 million over the five quarters.  
                                                          
13 The regional results for the Far West prove most unexpected. Both coefficients of the changes in the monetary 
base are negative with the coefficient of the contemporaneous change in the monetary base significantly negative. 
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The qualitative results exhibit an extremely strong and consistent pattern across states. 
That is, for the coefficients of the fourth-lagged change in the monetary base, all 51 of the 
individual state and District of Columbia coefficients exceed zero. Moreover, 49 of these 
coefficients prove significant. Weaker findings emerge for the contemporaneous, and first- and 
second-lagged changes in the monetary base, where 48 (3 significant), 47 (6 significant), and 31 
(0 significant) coefficients fall below zero, respectively, while 3 (0 significant), 4 (0 significant) 
and 10 (0 significant) exceed zero. For the third-lagged change in the monetary base, 47 
coefficients exceed zero, while 4 coefficients fall below zero. In this last case, 2 coefficients 
prove significant – all positive. 
Table 5 reports the results of estimating equation (1) using the quarterly call report data 
on bank loans on a region-by-region basis. As before, we perform these regional regressions in 
two different ways. The regressions identified as using pooled regional data pool the state level 
bank loan data in each region and impose the constraint that the coefficients equal each other 
across the states within the region under consideration. Thus, the USA regression is identical to 
the USA regression in Table 4. The regressions identified as the aggregate regional data sum the 
state level bank loan data into regional bank loan aggregates. In that sense, the aggregate 
regional data regressions conform in spirit to the state-by-state regressions in Table 4. Finally, 
the USA regression using the aggregate regional data imposes the constraint that the coefficients 
equal each other across regions in a pooled regression based on the aggregate regional data. 
The new USA regression that pools the data across regions yields findings similar to the 
USA regression that pools the data across states. That is, the coefficients of the contemporaneous 
and first-lagged changes in the monetary base are both significantly negative, while the 
coefficients of the third- and fourth-lagged changes are both significantly positive. Here, a one 
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million dollar increase in the monetary base leads to just over $2.7 million increase in bank loans 
in each region and a total increase of bank loans of just under $22 million after five quarters. 
The qualitative results show similar, but not identical, outcomes for the pooled regional 
and the aggregate regional data. That is, for the coefficients of the fourth-lagged change in the 
monetary base, all 8 individual regional coefficients significantly exceed zero. For the 
contemporaneous, first-, and second-lagged changes in the monetary base, all coefficients exhibit 
a negative sign; none are significant in the aggregate regional regressions, while 5 of the 
coefficients in the pooled regional regressions prove significant – one for the contemporaneous 
term and 4 for the first-lagged term. For the third-lagged change in the monetary base, the 
coefficients exhibit positive signs in all cases. No coefficient proves significant in the aggregate 
regional regressions, while one proves significant in the pooled regional regressions. 
What do the findings in Tables 4 and 5 tell us? At both the state and regional levels, a 
robust pattern emerges where changes in the monetary base significantly and positively affect 
bank loans with a four-quarter lag. That is, all of the action appears in the four-quarter lag and 
not at shorter frequencies. 
Next, we rank the regional results based on the magnitude of the coefficient of the fourth-
lagged change in the monetary base. The regressions for the aggregate regional data produce the 
following ranking from largest to smallest: Southeast, Mideast, Great Lakes, Far West, Plains, 
New England, Southwest, and Rocky Mountain.14 Once again, the Southeast, Mideast, and Great 
Lakes regions exhibit a magnitude on the coefficient of the fourth-lagged change in the monetary 
base that exceeds that coefficient in the USA regression that estimates a pooled regression across 
                                                          
14 The pooled regional regressions produce a ranking that moves the Southeast from first to third place and the 
Southwest from eighth to sixth in the rankings, where all other regions including the USA maintain their relative 
positions in the ranking. 
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the regions. Further, certain states within each region exhibit the largest effects. For the USA as a 
whole, the largest effects occur, in order, in New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Illinois, California, 
and Minnesota. Within each region, the states with the largest effects are as follows: Southeast 
(North Carolina), Mideast (New York), Great Lakes (Ohio), Far West (California), Plains 
(Minnesota), New England (Rhode Island), Southwest (Texas), and Rocky Mountain (Utah).15 
5. Conclusion 
This paper examines the magnitude and timing of the effects of changes in the monetary base on 
the aggregate and regional changes in bank loans within the United States. We consider both 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) regions and individual states and the District of Columbia 
for our regional analysis. The empirical analysis provides some insight on the bank-lending 
channel of monetary policy. 
We employ data from three different sources. First, we use monthly data reported by the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System on the monetary base and total loans and 
leases of the banking system. That data allow the disaggregation of total loans and leases into 
holdings by large and small domestic banks and foreign banks. Second, we employ annual data 
on a state-by-state basis reported at the web site of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 
Those state level data, of course, can aggregate into the eight Bureau of Economic Analysis 
regions. Finally, we collect the quarterly Report on Condition and Income (Call Report) data 
posted on the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago web site on a bank-by-bank basis. Those data 
aggregate into either state-level or the eight BEA regional-level data. In all cases, we explore the 
                                                          
15 The finding that Rhode Island possesses the biggest effect in the New England region and that North Carolina 
possesses the biggest effect in the Southeast region may reflect the consolidation of banking activities that occurred 
in response to the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, which permitted banks to report their 
financials on an aggregated basis in one state. Thus, the consolidation of balance sheet accounts by Fleet Bank in 
Rhode Island and Nations Bank (now Bank of America) in North Carolina may contribute to the size and 
significance of those regional coefficients. 
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size and timing of national monetary policy actions, as measured by the monetary base, on the 
national, regional, or state financial variables, as measured by bank loans.  
Our findings include the following. For the monthly data, changes in the monetary base 
produce reasonably quick changes in bank loans. Such changes in the monetary base have the 
largest and most persistent effect on small domestic banks and the smallest effect on foreign 
banks. The timing of the aggregate monthly data stands in contrast to the timing effects for our 
other data sets at longer frequencies – that is, the quarterly and annual data. Moreover, the 
monthly results also hint at the possibility that the responsiveness of bank loans to the monetary 
base increased after 1988. For the annual FDIC data, the regression pooled across all states 
supports the conclusion that changes in the monetary base affect bank loans with a one-year lag. 
Disaggregating to regional and then state levels weakens such a conclusion. That is, the observed 
patterns both qualitatively and quantitatively reveal more deviations from the regression findings 
from pooling across all states. For the quarterly call report data, both the state and regional 
regressions identify a robust pattern, where changes in the monetary base significantly and 
positively affect bank loans with a four-quarter lag. That is, all of the action appears in the four-
quarter lag with little activity appearing at any shorter intervals. 
Unresolved Issues 
Several additional issues remain unresolved. This section briefly enumerates the additional 
analysis that we are performing. First, footnote 15 noted that consolidation of financial 
statements after the passage of the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 may 
have polluted our findings. We have rerun our regression analysis terminating the sample with 
1994 data. The results generally match the findings with the longer sample, although the 
significance of the results falls. That is, the signs and magnitudes of the coefficients do not 
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change too much, but more coefficients prove insignificant. Viewed differently, the inclusion of 
the post-1994 data strengthens the findings. 
Second, our strongest, most-persistent result emerges for the quarterly data, where the 
fourth-lagged effect proves strongly significant across all regions and nearly all states. We 
considered extending the lags to five, six, and then eight lags. Once again, our findings prove 
extremely robust, but troubling. To wit, the coefficients on the lagged terms turn significantly 
negative at lag five. Overall, lags five and six appear significantly negative, while the second and 
third lags now more frequently prove significantly positive. At the moment, those findings 
remain a mystery. 
Third, while the magnitudes of the effects seem reasonably consistent within a given 
sample  when we disaggregate the regression analysis, the cross-sample magnitudes give us 
pause. For example, we do not have a reasonable explanation as to why the magnitudes of the 
regressions on the annual data give smaller effects than the regressions on the quarterly data. 
Clearly, the regressions are not nested. That is, if we regressed the quarterly change in loans onto 
the contemporaneous change and fourth lagged change in the monetary base, then we could 
aggregate across four consecutive quarters to generate something like our annual regressions. We 
would generate the annual change in loans regressed onto the contemporaneous annual change 
and the first lagged annual change in the monetary base. If we merely aggregated the quarterly 
regressions by adding up four consecutive quarterly regressions, we get the annual change in 
loans regressed on five annual changes in the monetary base, where each of the annual changes 
in the monetary base begins at a different quarter. And the larger magnitude occurs for the 
quarterly regression and not for the annual regressions, which seems intuitively backwards. 
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Finally, our regression analysis does not enter the debate over how to identify the bank 
lending versus balance sheet channels of the credit view of monetary policy transmission. That 
is, we do not attempt to identify whether the change in loans reflects shifts in the demand or 
supply of loans. We note in passing that the extent to which credit rationing due to adverse 
selection problems exists in the market for bank lending, changes in loans will reflect shifts in 
the supply of bank loans, supporting the lending channel. 
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Appendix: 
Data Sources: 
Data from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/ 
H3:  Aggregate Reserves of Depository Institutions and the Monetary Base, Historical Data 
Table 1:  Aggregate Reserves of Depository Institutions Adjusted for Changes in 
Reserve Requirements 
Total Reserves, Seasonally Adjusted (monthly), 1959:1 to 2003:3 
Monetary Base, Seasonally Adjusted (monthly), 1959:1 to 2003:3 
H8: Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks in the United States, Historical Data 
Loans and leases in bank credit 
All Commercial Banks, Seasonally Adjusted (monthly), 1959:1 to 2003:3 
Domestically Chartered Commercial Banks, Seasonally Adjusted (monthly), 
1973:1 to 2003:3 
Large Domestically Chartered Commercial Banks, Seasonally Adjusted 
(monthly), 1988:1 to 2003:3 
Small Domestically Chartered Commercial Banks, Seasonally Adjusted 
(monthly), 1988:1 to 2003:3 
Foreign-Related Institutions, Seasonally Adjusted (monthly), 1973:1 to 2003:3 
Data from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation: 
http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/index.asp 
Commercial Bank Reports 
Total Loans and Leases, All States and the District of Columbia, 1966 to 2001 
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Data from the Report on Condition and Income (Call Report): 
http://www.chicagofed.org/economicresearchanddata/data/bhcdatabase/index.cfm 
Total Loans, Net of Allowance and Reserve, RCFD2125, (quarterly), 1976:I to 2002:III 
Regional Identification: 
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) Regions: 
 
New England Region 
Connecticut 
Maine 
Massachusetts 
New Hampshire 
Rhode Island 
Vermont 
 
Mideast Region 
Delaware 
District of Columbia 
Maryland 
New Jersey 
New York 
Pennsylvania 
 
Great Lakes Region 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Michigan 
Ohio 
Wisconsin 
 
Plains Region 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Minnesota 
Missouri 
Nebraska 
North Dakota 
South Dakota 
 
 
 
Southeast Region 
Alabama 
Arkansas 
Florida 
Georgia 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Mississippi 
North Carolina 
South Carolina 
Tennessee 
Virginia 
West Virginia 
 
Southwest Region 
Arizona 
New Mexico 
Oklahoma 
Texas 
 
Rocky Mountain Region 
Colorado 
Idaho 
Montana 
Utah 
Wyoming 
 
Far West Region 
Alaska 
California 
Hawaii 
Nevada 
Oregon 
Washington 
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Table 1: Monetary Base and Loans: National, Monthly Data 
 
 Constant ∆MB ∆MB(-1) ∆MB(-2) ∆MB(-3) ∆MB(-4) 
Loans: Total (1959:1 to 2003:3)      
∆LNS 24.90* -0.83* 2.51* 1.45* -0.16 2.84* 
 (5.02) (-2.45) (6.96) (3.67) (-0.34) (5.72) 
Loans: Domestic Banks (1973:1 to 2003:3)    
∆LNS 27.66* -0.05 2.15* 1.11** -0.39 2.09* 
 (3.43) (-0.12) (5.36) (2.52) (-0.77) (3.76) 
Loans: Large Domestic Banks (1988:1 to 2003:3)     
∆LNS 23.81 -0.97** 1.19* 0.39 -0.88 1.80* 
 (1.01) (-2.37) (2.73) (0.80) (-1.63) (2.80) 
Loans: Small Domestic Banks (1988:1 to 2003:3)    
∆LNS -72.54* 1.28* 1.35* 1.21* 0.96* 1.25* 
 (-7.04) (7.20) (7.11) (5.76) (4.08) (4.46) 
Loans: Foreign Banks (1973:1 to 2003:3)    
∆LNS 9.56* -0.88* 0.26* 0.24** 0.17 0.58* 
 (5.32) (-10.47) (2.91) (2.42) (1.52) (4.66) 
Note: We employed STATA8 to generate the regression results. The symbols are defined as 
follows: ∆LNS equals the change in loans and ∆MB(-i) equals the i-th lag of the change 
in the monetary base. Numbers in parentheses under coefficient estimates are t-values. 
 
* means significantly different from zero at the 1-percent level. 
** means significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level. 
 
 29
Table 2: Monetary Base and Loans: State, Annual Data, 1966 to 2001 
 
 Constant ∆MB ∆MB (-1)   Constant ∆MB ∆MB (-1)
USA     Missouri 
∆LNS 758 0.01 0.07*  ∆LNS 1,009 0.07 -0.06 
 (1.68) (0.86) (3.95)   (0.95) (1.75) (-1.56) 
Alabama     Montana    
∆LNS -2227 0.27* 0.09  ∆LNS 140 0.008** -0.002 
 (-1.41) (4.57) (1.52)   (1.44) (2.22) (-0.67) 
Alaska     Nebraska    
∆LNS 51 0.002 0.0004  ∆LNS 168 0.01 0.02* 
 (0.61) (0.54) (0.12)   (1.31) (1.93) (3.15) 
Arizona     Nevada    
∆LNS -109 -0.06** 0.13*  ∆LNS -488 -0.02 0.10* 
 (-0.16) (-2.41) (4.95)   (-0.79) (-0.81) (4.11) 
Arkansas     New Hampshire   
∆LNS 285 0.01 -0.0009  ∆LNS -337 0.03** 0.02 
 (1.37) (1.71) (-0.11)   (-1.14) (2.58) (1.80) 
California    New Jersey   
∆LNS 2,830* -1.01* -0.30  ∆LNS 1,236 -0.02 -0.01 
 (3.79) (-3.68) (-1.02)   (0.65) (-0.28) (-0.19) 
Colorado     New Mexico   
∆LNS 26 0.01 0.04**  ∆LNS 128 0.003 0.002 
 (0.05) (0.66) (1.97)   (0.75) (0.56) (0.36) 
Connecticut    New York   
∆LNS 637 -0.03 -0.01  ∆LNS 1,050 -0.17 0.66** 
 (0.75) (-1.04) (-0.20)   (1.37) (-0.62) (2.20) 
Delaware    North Carolina   
∆LNS 2,722** -0.09 0.12**  ∆LNS -2,470** 1.36* 1.11** 
 (1.97) (-1.82) (2.24)   (-2.10) (3.16) (2.42) 
District of Columbia  North Dakota   
∆LNS 449 -0.02 -0.01  ∆LNS -143 -0.01 0.04* 
 (1.47) (-1.69) (0.84)   (-1.07) (-1.62) (7.48) 
Florida     Ohio    
∆LNS 3,640 0.02 -0.19  ∆LNS -1,885 0.47* 0.22 
 (1.35) (0.23) (-1.78)   (-0.47) (3.19) (1.41) 
Georgia     Oklahoma   
∆LNS -2,141 -0.21 0.59*  ∆LNS 139 0.01 0.02 
 (-0.61) (-1.64) (4.31)   (0.41) (1.07) (1.81) 
Hawaii     Oregon    
∆LNS 345 -0.01 0.02  ∆LNS -223 -0.05 0.09* 
 (1.51) (-1.56) (1.94)   (-0.28) (-1.71) (2.93) 
Idaho     Pennsylvania   
∆LNS -13 -0.002 0.005  ∆LNS 6,503 -0.15 -0.07 
 (-0.04) (-0.15) (0.39)   (1.79) (-1.15) (-0.50) 
 
 
 30
Table 2: Monetary Base and Loans: State, Annual Data, 1966 to 2001 (continued) 
 
 Constant ∆MB ∆MB (-1)   Constant ∆MB ∆MB (-1)
Illinois     Rhode Island   
∆LNS 606 0.31* 0.05  ∆LNS -1,814 -0.01 0.38* 
 (0.30) (4.12) (0.66)   (-0.56) (-0.04) (2.97) 
Indiana     South Carolina   
∆LNS 1,647 -0.03 0.07  ∆LNS 179 0.01 0.01 
 (1.25) (-0.62) (1.27)   (0.39) (0.63) (0.52) 
Iowa     South Dakota   
∆LNS 531* 0.01 0.002  ∆LNS 144 0.06** 0.003 
 (2.81) (1.53) (0.29)   (0.19) (2.13) (0.11) 
Kansas     Tennessee   
∆LNS 287 -0.002 0.02*  ∆LNS 1,514 0.04 -0.02 
 (1.50) (-0.36) (3.19)   (1.49) (1.06) (-0.45) 
Kentucky    Texas    
∆LNS 774* 0.01 0.004  ∆LNS 3,619 -0.10 0.01 
 (2.90) (1.23) (0.34)   (1.18) (-0.92) (0.07) 
Louisiana    Utah    
∆LNS 421 -0.02 0.04**  ∆LNS -1,060 -0.01 0.18* 
 (0.87) (-1.28) (2.34)   (-1.23) (-0.38) (5.29) 
Maine     Vermont    
∆LNS 125 -0.009 0.01  ∆LNS 130** -0.001 0.003 
 (0.71) (-1.45) (1.51)   (2.15) (-0.65) (1.09) 
Maryland     Virginia    
∆LNS -339 0.03 0.04  ∆LNS 1,727 0.09** -0.13* 
 (-0.17) (0.42) (0.55)   (1.87) (2.54) (-3.59) 
Massachusetts    Washington   
∆LNS 3,205 0.16 -0.33*  ∆LNS 523 -0.04 0.03 
 (1.21) (1.65) (-3.22)   (0.35) (-0.72) (0.60) 
Michigan     West Virginia   
∆LNS 755 0.06** 0.09*  ∆LNS 518** 0.01 -0.03* 
 (1.11) (2.35) (3.22)   (2.40) (1.23) (-2.97) 
Minnesota    Wisconsin   
∆LNS -555 -0.22 0.40*  ∆LNS 1,262* -0.01 0.04** 
 (-0.15) (-1.64) (2.83)   (2.81) (-0.88) (2.00) 
Mississippi    Wyoming   
∆LNS 193 0.001 0.03  ∆LNS 20 -0.02* 0.01* 
 (0.53) (0.05) (1.84)   (1.63) (-3.92) (2.93) 
Note: See Table 1. 
 
* means significantly different from zero at the 1-percent level. 
** means significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level. 
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Table 3: Monetary Base and Loans: Regional, Annual Data, 1966 to 2001 
 
Pooled Regional Data  Aggregate Regional Data 
 Constant ∆MB ∆MB(-1)   Constant ∆MB ∆MB(-1)
USA  USA 
∆LNS 758 0.01 0.07*  ∆LNS 4,832 0.09 0.44* 
 (1.68) (0.86) (3.95)   (1.71) (0.87) (4.01) 
Far West     Far West    
∆LNS 4,757* -0.19* -0.01  ∆LNS 2,850* -1.13* -0.06 
 (3.20) (-3.45) (-0.16)   (4.02) (-4.34) (-0.20) 
Great Lakes    Great Lakes   
∆LNS 477 0.16* 0.09**  ∆LNS 2,386 0.79* 0.46 
 (0.43) (3.92) (2.14)   (0.33) (2.99) (1.63) 
Mideast     Mideast    
∆LNS 3,510** -0.07 0.12  ∆LNS 2,110(( -0.43 0.72** 
 (2.07) (-1.15) (1.83)   (2.55) (-1.41) (2.25) 
New England    New England   
∆LNS 324 0.02 0.01  ∆LNS 1,946 0.14 0.07 
 (0.40) (0.79) (0.39)   (0.77) (1.52) (0.74) 
Plains     Plains    
∆LNS 206 -0.01 0.06**  ∆LNS 1,441 -0.08 0.42* 
 (0.34) (-0.52) (2.57)   (0.48) (-0.73) (3.60) 
Rocky Mountain    Rocky Mountain   
∆LNS -141 -0.002 0.05*  ∆LNS -704 -0.01 0.23* 
 (-0.55) (-0.25) (4.66)   (-0.69) (-0.31) (5.82) 
Southeast    Southeast   
∆LNS -1,649 0.13* 0.13**  ∆LNS -1,980 1.59* 1.52* 
 (-1.27) (2.77) (2.49)   (-1.89) (4.12) (3.71) 
Southwest    Southwest   
∆LNS 944 -0.04 0.04  ∆LNS 3,777 -0.15 0.17 
 (1.20) (-1.28) (1.38)   (1.09) (-1.16) (1.25) 
Note: See Table 1. The appendix lists the states in each region. 
 
* means significantly different from zero at the 1-percent level. 
** means significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level. 
 
 32
Table 4: Monetary Base and Loans: State, Quarterly Data, 
1976:I to 2002:III 
 
 Constant ∆MB ∆MB(-1) ∆MB(-2) ∆MB(-3) ∆MB(-4) 
USA       
∆LNS -2,129* -0.12* -0.15* -0.04 0.13* 0.57* 
 (-5.31) (-3.64) (-4.36) (-1.01) (3.64) (16.36) 
Alabama       
∆LNS -4,416** -0.05 -0.17 -0.05 0.20 0.89* 
 (-2.04) (-0.26) (-0.93) (-0.25) (1.10) (4.72) 
Alaska       
∆LNS -87 -0.005 -0.005 -0.001 0.004 0.02* 
 (-1.51) (-1.01) (-1.10) (-0.17) (0.89) (4.34) 
Arizona       
∆LNS -1,277 -0.08 -0.10 -0.02 0.10 0.34* 
 (-1.72) (-1.33) (-1.60) (-0.28) (1.57) (5.29) 
Arkansas       
∆LNS -395 -0.03 -0.04 -0.001 0.02 0.12* 
 (-1.36) (-1.10) (-1.74) (-0.03) (0.90) (4.68) 
California      
∆LNS 770 -0.58 -0.66 -0.34 -0.01 1.36* 
 (0.16) (-1.42) (-1.62) (-0.82) (-0.02) (3.25) 
Colorado       
∆LNS -851 -0.05 -0.05 -0.01 0.04 0.21* 
 (-1.82) (-1.18) (-1.15) (-0.14) (1.07) (5.15) 
Connecticut     
∆LNS -498 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 0.03 0.17* 
 (-0.85) (-1.08) (-0.91) (-0.55) (0.64) (3.31) 
Delaware     
∆LNS -2,652 -0.02 -0.05 -0.14 0.10 0.75* 
 (-1.34) (-0.14) (-0.30) (-0.83) (0.59) (4.35) 
District of Columbia      
∆LNS 93 -0.01 -0.01 -0.005 -0.004 0.002 
 (1.22) (-0.98) (-1.19) (-0.71) (-0.65) (0.23) 
Florida       
∆LNS 370 0.04 -0.30* -0.12 0.03 0.269** 
 (0.31) (0.39) (-2.91) (-1.20) (0.29) (2.58) 
Georgia       
∆LNS -5,066** -0.53* 0.16 0.17 0.23 0.92* 
 (-2.18) (-2.66) (0.81) (0.87) (1.16) (4.53) 
Hawaii       
∆LNS -376 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.12* 
 (-1.29) (-1.13) (-1.33) (-0.57) (0.95) (4.77) 
Idaho       
∆LNS -130 -0.002 0.001 0.004 0.01 0.01 
 (-1.18) (-0.28) (0.11) (0.39) (0.66) (1.32) 
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Table 4: Monetary Base and Loans: State, Quarterly Data, 
1976:I to 2002:III (continued) 
 
 Constant ∆MB ∆MB(-1) ∆MB(-2) ∆MB(-3) ∆MB(-4) 
Illinois       
∆LNS -7,164 -0.37 -0.08 -0.08 0.28 1.53* 
 (-1.90) (-1.14) (-0.25) (-0.25) (0.86) (4.64) 
Indiana       
∆LNS -1,487 -0.08 -0.25* -0.07 0.18** 0.49* 
 (-1.53) (-0.97) (-2.95) (-0.89) (2.18) (5.77) 
Iowa       
∆LNS -718 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.04 0.20* 
 (-1.52) (-1.11) (-0.96) (-0.65) (0.88) (4.82) 
Kansas       
∆LNS -651 -0.05 -0.05 -0.01 0.04 0.18* 
 (-1.60) (-1.31) (-1.38) (-0.18) (1.08) (5.01) 
Kentucky       
∆LNS -801 -0.06 -0.07 -0.03 0.05 0.26* 
 (-1.32) (-1.17) (-1.36) (-0.52) (0.89) (4.84) 
Louisiana     
∆LNS -873 -0.05 -0.06 -0.02 0.05 0.25* 
 (-1.49) (-1.10) (-1.19) (-0.49) (0.91) (4.87) 
Maine       
∆LNS -205 -0.02 -0.02 -0.001 0.02 0.05* 
 (-1.15) (-1.45) (-1.20) (-0.04) (1.39) (3.50) 
Maryland       
∆LNS -1,086 -0.07 -0.06 0.01 0.07 0.24* 
 (-1.37) (-0.97) (-0.88) (0.16) (1.03) (3.47) 
Massachusetts     
∆LNS 233 0.14 -0.57* -0.20 0.06 0.50* 
 (0.14) (0.94) (-3.97) (-1.35) (0.42) (3.38) 
Michigan       
∆LNS -3,003 -0.19 -0.18 -0.03 0.16 0.79* 
 (-1.66) (-1.23) (-1.18) (-0.22) (1.05) (4.97) 
Minnesota     
∆LNS -3,910 -0.13 -0.38 -0.04 0.27 1.02* 
 (-1.71) (-0.69) (-1.93) (-0.19) (1.36) (5.08) 
Mississippi     
∆LNS -579 -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 0.04 0.17* 
 (-1.55) (-1.15) (-1.52) (-0.66) (1.39) (5.13) 
Missouri       
∆LNS -1,077 -0.04 -0.03 0.05 -0.06 0.26* 
 (-1.24) (-0.59) (-0.42) (0.73) (-0.76) (3.44) 
Montana       
∆LNS -182 -0.01 -0.01 0.00002 0.01 0.05* 
 (-1.55) (-1.45) (-1.45) (0.00) (1.18) (4.77) 
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Table 4: Monetary Base and Loans: State, Quarterly Data, 
1976:I to 2002:III (continued) 
 
 Constant ∆MB ∆MB(-1) ∆MB(-2) ∆MB(-3) ∆MB(-4) 
Nebraska       
∆LNS -573 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.15* 
 (-1.66) (-1.01) (-1.47) (-0.24) (1.08) (5.01) 
Nevada       
∆LNS -1,121** -0.03 -0.08 -0.002 0.08 0.24* 
 (-2.07) (-0.64) (-1.66) (-0.05) (1.75) (5.08) 
New Hampshire     
∆LNS -640 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.04 0.15* 
 (-1.74) (-0.46) (-0.75) (-1.01) (1.33) (4.52) 
New Jersey     
∆LNS -1,633 -0.09 -0.06 0.07 -0.05 0.41* 
 (-1.32) (-0.81) (-0.58) (0.63) (-0.44) (3.75) 
New Mexico     
∆LNS -234 -0.01 -0.02 -0.001 0.01 0.06* 
 (-1.61) (-0.93) (-1.26) (-0.06) (1.09) (4.39) 
New York     
∆LNS -1,800 -1.25 -1.54 -0.32 1.18 5.07* 
 (-1.57) (-1.27) (-1.57) (-0.33) (1.19) (5.03) 
North Carolina     
∆LNS -2,320** -0.70 -0.89 0.19 1.25 4.60* 
 (-2.04) (-0.72) (-0.91) (0.19) (1.27) (4.62) 
North Dakota     
∆LNS -372 -0.03 -0.04** -0.02 0.06* 0.10* 
 (-1.86) (-1.68) (-2.07) (-1.26) (3.22) (5.72) 
Ohio       
∆LNS -8,250 -0.41 -0.55 -0.16 0.62 2.07* 
 (-1.84) (-1.08) (-1.44) (-0.42) (1.60) (5.28) 
Oklahoma     
∆LNS -761 -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 0.04 0.20* 
 (-1.71) (-1.05) (-1.35) (-0.42) (1.14) (5.12) 
Oregon       
∆LNS -679 -0.09 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.11** 
 (-1.11) (-1.69) (0.50) (0.39) (1.09) (1.99) 
Pennsylvania     
∆LNS -2,364 -0.20 -0.28 -0.19 0.17 0.90* 
 (-0.90) (-0.91) (-1.24) (-0.85) (0.74) (3.93) 
Rhode Island     
∆LNS -4,825** -0.37 0.13 -0.03 0.29 0.89* 
 (-2.18) (-1.94) (0.70) (-0.14) (1.52) (4.60) 
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Table 4: Monetary Base and Loans: State, Quarterly Data, 
1976:I to 2002:III (continued) 
 
 Constant ∆MB ∆MB(-1) ∆MB(-2) ∆MB(-3) ∆MB(-4) 
South Carolina      
∆LNS -3,961 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.12* 
 (-1.23) (-1.03) (-1.05) (-0.31) (0.66) (4.24) 
South Dakota     
∆LNS -916 -0.05 -0.07 0.01 0.07 0.22* 
 (-1.82) (-1.18) (-1.56) (0.13) (1.61) (4.92) 
Tennessee     
∆LNS -884 -0.17** -0.17 -0.02 0.10 0.42* 
 (-0.86) (-2.00) (-1.92) (-0.19) (1.15) (4.71) 
Texas       
∆LNS -2,450 -0.17 -0.17 -0.02 0.05 0.73* 
 (-1.26) (-1.00) (-1.03) (-0.11) (0.30) (4.25) 
Utah       
∆LNS -1,949** -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 0.12 0.48* 
 (-2.01) (-0.81) (-0.99) (-0.93) (1.43) (5.64) 
Vermont       
∆LNS -139 -0.01 -0.01 -0.004 0.01 0.04* 
 (-1.27) (-1.31) (-1.24) (-0.44) (0.90) (4.59) 
Virginia       
∆LNS -468 0.09 -0.29* -0.10 0.05 0.32* 
 (-0.54) (1.25) (-3.85) (-1.33) (0.64) (4.23) 
Washington     
∆LNS -1,008 -0.08 -0.10 -0.02 0.08 0.32* 
 (-1.30) (-1.25) (-1.54) (-0.36) (1.12) (4.64) 
West Virginia     
∆LNS -287 -0.02 -0.02 0.001 0.04 0.05** 
 (-1.29) (-1.03) (-0.84) (0.05) (1.89) (2.46) 
Wisconsin     
∆LNS -1,370 -0.14 -0.10 -0.02 0.10 0.42* 
 (-1.37) (-1.65) (-1.22) (-0.27) (1.12) (4.81) 
Wyoming     
∆LNS -33 -0.03* -0.02** -0.003 0.01 0.04* 
 (-0.38) (-3.81) (-2.13) (-0.35) (1.20) (5.75) 
Note: See Table 1. 
 
* means significantly different from zero at the 1-percent level. 
** means significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level. 
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Table 5: Monetary Base and Loans: Regional, Quarterly Data, 
1976:I to 2002:III 
 
Pooled Regional Data 
 Constant ∆MB ∆MB(-1) ∆MB(-2) ∆MB(-3) ∆MB(-4) 
USA       
∆LNS -2,129* -0.12* -0.15* -0.04 0.13* 0.57* 
 (-5.31) (-3.64) (-4.36) (-1.01) (3.64) (16.36) 
Far West       
∆LNS -417 -0.14 -0.14** -0.06 0.04 0.36* 
 (-0.50) (-1.90) (-1.99) (-0.83) (0.54) (4.94) 
Great Lakes     
∆LNS -4,255* -0.24** -0.23** -0.07 0.27** 1.06* 
 (-3.34) (-2.19) (-2.14) (-0.68) (2.44) (9.51) 
Mideast       
∆LNS -4,276** -0.27 -0.33 -0.10 0.24 1.23* 
 (-2.01) (-1.50) (-1.84) (-0.53) (1.33) (6.59) 
New England     
∆LNS -1,012** -0.06 -0.10** -0.05 0.08 0.30* 
 (-1.99) (-1.27) (-2.08) (-1.10) (1.73) (6.76) 
Plains       
∆LNS -1,174* -0.05 -0.09** -0.01 0.06 0.30* 
 (-3.03) (-1.63) (-2.76) (-0.17) (1.89) (8.96) 
Rocky Mountain     
∆LNS -629* -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.04 0.16* 
 (-2.72) (-1.62) (-1.60) (-0.83) (1.90) (7.85) 
Southeast     
∆LNS -3,084* -0.13 -0.16 -0.001 0.17 0.70* 
 (-2.92) (-1.43) (-1.77) (-0.01) (1.90) (7.55) 
Southwest     
∆LNS -1,181** -0.08 -0.08 -0.01 0.05 0.33* 
 (-2.18) (-1.63) (-1.83) (-0.29) (1.12) (6.97) 
Aggregate Regional Data 
 Constant ∆MB ∆MB(-1) ∆MB(-2) ∆MB(-3) ∆MB(-4) 
USA       
∆LNS -1,350* -0.79** -0.94* -0.21 0.81** 3.64* 
 (-3.51) (-2.42) (-2.88) (-0.64) (2.42) (10.79) 
Far West       
∆LNS -2,502 -0.81 -0.85 -0.36 0.23 2.17* 
 (-0.41) (-1.55) (-1.62) (-0.68) (0.44) (4.01) 
Great Lakes     
∆LNS -2,130 -1.19 -1.16 -0.37 1.34 5.30* 
 (-1.78) (-1.17) (-1.14) (-0.36) (1.30) (5.08) 
Mideast       
∆LNS -2,570 -1.63 -2.00 -0.58 1.47 7.37* 
 (-1.49) (-1.11) (-1.36) (-0.39) (0.99) (4.90) 
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Table 5: Monetary Base and Loans: Regional, Quarterly Data, 
1976:I to 2002:III (continued) 
 
Aggregate Regional Data 
 Constant ∆MB ∆MB(-1) ∆MB(-2) ∆MB(-3) ∆MB(-4) 
New England      
∆LNS -6,074 -0.33 -0.54 -0.29 0.46 1.81* 
 (-1.41) (-0.90) (-1.47) (-0.78) (1.22) (4.78) 
Plains       
∆LNS -8,216 -0.38 -0.64 -0.04 0.44 2.13* 
 (-1.68) (-0.91) (-1.54) (-0.09) (1.05) (4.98) 
Rocky Mountain     
∆LNS -3,145 -0.16 -0.16 -0.08 0.19 0.80* 
 (-1.92) (-1.14) (-1.13) (-0.58) (1.35) (5.54) 
Southeast     
∆LNS -3,700 -1.54 -1.91 -0.01 2.08 8.39* 
 (-1.87) (-0.92) (-1.13) (-0.00) (1.22) (4.85) 
Southwest      
∆LNS -4,723 -0.30 -0.34 -0.05 0.21 1.32* 
 (-1.48) (-1.11) (-1.25) (-0.20) (0.76) (4.75) 
Note: See Table 1. The appendix lists the states in each region. 
 
* means significantly different from zero at the 1-percent level. 
** means significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level. 
 
